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Why Liberal Tolerance, Rightly 





WILLIAM A. GALSTON* 
“A liberal is a man too broad-minded to take his own side in a quarrel.” 
—Robert Frost1 
“This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its
deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed.”
—Joseph Goebbels2 
* © 2017. William A. Galston. William A. Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in
the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies, where he serves as a senior fellow.
1. Frost appears to have used these words in discussing the newly-elected John F.
Kennedy, whom he did not regard as a liberal in this sense.  He may well have gotten the
thought behind these words from a close friend, Harvard philosophy professor William
Ernest Hocking, whose book What Man Can Make of Man, contains the line, “He lends 
himself to the gibe that he is ‘so very liberal, that he cannot bring himself to take his own 
side in a quarrel.’”  William Ernest Hocking, What Man Can Make of Man 45 (2d ed.
1942); see also THE WORDSWORTH DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 133 (Connie Robertson
ed., 1998); Barry Popik, Entry from December 06, 2009, BARRYPOPIK.COM: THE BIG APPLE
(Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/a_liberal_is_a_
man_too_broad_minded_to_take_his_own_side_in_a_quarrel/ [https://perma.cc/DC4B-XKZ3].
2. Judith Wise, Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution
and the Banning of the Free German Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 301,
301 (1998) (citing Gregory Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 1 (1995)). 
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I. THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL TOLERANCE
One of the most familiar criticisms of liberal democracy is that it cannot
defend itself against its enemies while remaining true to its principles.3 
This criticism is odd as well as unjust because theorists regarded as arch-
liberals offer compelling reasons to reject it.4 
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill asserts that 
In this and most other civilized countries, . . . an engagement by which a person
should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and
void; . . . The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a
person’s voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary choice is
evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, to him,
and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own
means of pursuing it.  But by selling himself as a slave, he abdicates his liberty;
he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that single act.  He therefore defeats, in
his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to 
dispose of himself. . . .  The principle of freedom cannot require that he should
be free not to be free.  It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom.5 
Mill’s account of liberalism, then, is anything but neutral.  Freedom is the
highest good, and it is self-limiting.6  In American rights lingo, it is 
unalienable.7 
As Mill notes, his reasoning is of far wider application. One such extension 
is of particular relevance for the purposes of this conference.  Not only is
individual freedom self-limiting, so is collective freedom.  A people cannot 
alienate its right to self-determination.  Nor must it accept individuals’ or 
groups’ acts that would weaken or undermine that right. Taking freedom and
 3. See, e.g., LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR 
AND MEMORY OF YITZHAK RABIN 1–2 (Raphael Cohen-Almagor ed., 2000). 
4. See, e.g., Paul Starr, Why Liberalism Works, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 2007, at 34– 
40; see also Stephen R.C. Hicks, Liberalism: The Fifteen Best Arguments, 37 REASON PAPERS 
108, 111–32 (2015). 
5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 198–99 (Ticknor & Fields 2d ed. 1863) (1859).
6. Id. 
7. See id. at 199.
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self-determination seriously provides a principled basis for limiting the 
scope of tolerance. 
This logic dovetails neatly with the Declaration of Independence.  All 
individuals have unalienable rights, the Declaration asserts, the securing 
of which is the purpose of government, rightly understood.8  All government, 
in turn, derives its just powers from the consent of the governed.9  The
people always remain free to withdraw that consent whenever the institutions 
they have created threaten to undermine the purpose for which they were 
created.10  They are free, therefore, to suppress any forces that would weaken 
genuinely rights-promoting institutions. 
To avoid undermining the liberty they seek to protect, the people must
assess these threats coolly and impartially, a standard that is hard to meet
in times of alarm and fear.  But the possible abuse of the right of collective
self-protection does not negate the right. It points, rather, to the importance of 
institutions that will reduce, so far as possible, the incidence of such abuses.
My second arch-liberal reaches a similar conclusion. In a section of A 
Theory of Justice titled “Toleration of the Intolerant,” Rawls enquires into
the circumstances, if any, that would give tolerant groups adequate warrant not
to tolerate intolerant groups.11 The mere existence of intolerant groups, he
argues, is not enough.
A more stringent condition is required: there must be some considerable risks to
our own legitimate interests.  Thus just citizens should strive to preserve the 
constitution with all its equal liberties as long as liberty itself and their own 
freedom are not in danger.  They can properly force the intolerant to respect the 
liberty of others . . . .  But when the constitution itself is secure, there is no reason
to deny freedom to the intolerant.12 
Two discrete elements, then, define the limit of tolerance—a principle 
of self-limitation and an empirical determination that the conditions triggering 
the application of that principle have been met.  The ability to make such 
determinations must be lodged somewhere. Moved by prejudice or 
ignorance, the people empowered to make them will sometimes go astray. 
The attorney-general of California requested the mass internment of
Japanese-Americans, the president of the United States authorized it, and 
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
9. Id.
 10. Id.
 11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 190–94 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999)
(1971).
12. Id. at 192. 
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the Supreme Court of the United States ratified it.13  But the united judgment
of Earl Warren, Franklin Roosevelt, and six justices—including Hugo 
Black, William O. Douglas, and Felix Frankfurter—did not make it right.14 
If individuals of this caliber, representing diverse jurisdictions and branches
of government, could get it so wrong, we are forced to conclude that no
human contrivances can eliminate the possibility of error.  The alternative 
is to bind ourselves with categorical prohibitions that could deprive liberal 
democracies of their ability to defend themselves.  As Arthur Goldberg,
another unimpeachably liberal justice, wrote in Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza,
“[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it
is not a suicide pact.”15 
II. TOLERANCE AS AN ATTITUDE
In rushing to the defense of liberal tolerance as a coherent practice, I
have bypassed its definition and justification.  I begin with tolerance as an 
inner sentiment. 
In ordinary language, tolerance is often used as a synonym for acceptance.
The tolerant person, we say, is “broadminded,” not fazed by the kinds of 
novelties that bring the rest of us up short.  Where most people are “judgmental,”
we regard the tolerant person as indifferent to the kinds of differences that
make a different for less tolerant persons. 
In this case, however, customary usage leads us astray.  Tolerance is not 
the same as acceptance or indifference.16  Consider a father who disapproves 
of his daughter’s latest boyfriend but thinks that other factors also should
shape his attitude toward the relationship.  He may believe, for example,
that it would be better for his daughter to arrive—through her own
experience—at a more accurate assessment of her boyfriend’s qualities.
Or he may fear that expressing his views openly may trigger what
psychologists call “oppositional behavior,” driving his daughter more firmly
into her boyfriend’s arms.17 
The attitude of tolerance rejects any direct inference from one’s evaluation 
of X to the stance one should adopt toward X.  It reflects, rather, an
13.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). 
14. See id.
15.  Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
16. See, e.g., Jay Schiffman, Tolerance as Understanding, 3 UNIV. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1, 15 (2003); see also Gila Stopler, “A Rank of Usurpation of 
Power” – The Role of Patriarchal Religion and Culture in the Subordination of Women, 
15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 365, 394–95 (2008). 
17. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 462–63 (5th ed. 2013). 
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individual’s openness to the full range of considerations relevant to
selecting the most thoughtful stance.18 
It may appear that the attitude of tolerance is one of disapproval modified 
by prudence.19  I think it is more complicated than that.  We hold almost 
all our beliefs on some basis short of certainty.  If someone whose character 
we despise or judgment we mistrust approves something we disapprove, 
we are not inclined to change our mind.  But if someone of good character 
disagrees with our assessment, we have some reason to rethink it. So the
tolerant father will pause to ask himself whether his besotted daughter
is seeing something that he himself is not.  Beneath the boyfriend’s surly
demeanor may beat a tender heart.  He may look like a slacker, but Steve
Wozniak probably did too.20 
Tolerance also requires an awareness and assessment of risk.21  The  
father may think there is a 50/50 chance that the boyfriend will end up
breaking his daughter’s heart while believing that he should tolerate the 
relationship.  But if he thinks there is a significant chance that the boyfriend 
at some point will physically assault his daughter, tolerance would manifest
inadequate concern for his daughter. The nature of the potential harm
defines the limit of permissible risk.  A tolerant attitude implies a kind of 
capaciousness, but it is not boundless.22 
III. TOLERANCE AS A PRACTICE
As distinct from the attitude, tolerance as a practice is more clearly
triadic, as follows: Although (1) B disapproves of X, (2) B refrains from 
suppressing X even though (3) B has the power to suppress X.23
 18. See Schiffman, supra note 16, at 15. 
19. See, e.g., Karen Knop et al., From Multiculturalism to Technique Feminism, 
Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 650 (2002) (quoting Martha 
Minow, Tolerance in an Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 435, 457 (2007)). 
20. Steve Wozniak is a programmer, developer, and entrepreneur who co-founded
Apple with Steve Jobs in 1976. See About Steve Wozniak aka “The Woz,”  WOZ.ORG, 
http://www.woz.org/about [https://perma.cc/RRS6-87JM]. 
21. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 192. 
22. See, e.g., The Limits of Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES: THE MORAL OF THE STORY (Apr.
14, 2009, 11:30 AM), https://ethicist.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/limited-tolerance/
[https://perma.cc/6AKQ-G7UJ].
23. See Lois Eveleth, John Locke and the Problem of Toleration, 28 FAC. & STAFF
– ARTICLES & PAPERS 17, 20–21 (2007); Polycarp Ikuenobe, Diverse Religious Practices
and the Limits of Liberal Tolerance, in DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION 309, 318 (David Odell-
Scott ed., 2004). 
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If B approves of X, it is an abuse of speech to say that B tolerates X. 
Other than outright perversity, B has no motive for suppressing X.  But 
tolerance implies self-restraint in the face of motives for acting without 
restraint.24 
In a similar vein: if B does not have the power to suppress X, then it 
would be odd to say that B tolerates X, because B has no choice.  As a practice,
tolerance is a voluntary act within a hierarchical power relationship. 
When we move from description to normative judgment, further
implications emerge.  If we regard tolerance as a good or virtuous practice, 
then one of its limits is the line separating the tolerable from the intolerable.
If you have the power to suppress X and X is rightly regarded as intolerable, 
then forbearance in the face of X is wrong.  Standing by while someone 
is being assaulted is shameful. 
It follows, I suggest, that tolerance presupposes a distinctive structure 
of the normative world.25 The bare idea of a normative triad is hardly new. 
For millennia, philosophers have distinguished between good, bad, and
indifferent. We are to promote the good, discourage the bad, and choose freely
among those things that are indifferent from a moral point of view.  Except 
as a matter of episodic prudence, forbearance has no role in this three-fold
way.
Tolerance requires a further distinction within the category of the bad. 
Some bad things are simply intolerable and require us to act against them
as best we can.  But there is another category of bad things such that we
are not required to act against them. Indeed, we are required not to act against 
them.  This is what tolerance as forbearance means, and it is what gives 
the practice of tolerance its air of paradox.26 
It is possible to dispel the paradox by dissolving the problem that gives 
rise to it.  If we wrongly regard X as bad when it is in fact good—or at least 
indifferent—then our failure to act against X is hardly paradoxical but 
rather straightforwardly justified, even if it rests on confusion.  If all occasions 
of tolerance were of this character, then much liberal discourse would be 
otiose. 
But to proceed categorically down this path would be to dismiss too
much everyday experience. Consider childrearing practices.  There are laws 
prohibiting child abuse and neglect and allowing public authorities to intervene 
against adults who act in this manner.27  These laws define the public perimeter 
of the intolerable in adult-child relationships. 
24. See Eveleth, supra note 23, at 20–21. 
25. See Stopler, supra note 16, at 394–95. 
26. See HANS OBERDIEK, TOLERANCE: BETWEEN FORBEARANCE AND ACCEPTANCE 
12 (2001). 
27. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11174.3 (Deering 2008). 
204
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But this is not to say that everything outside this perimeter is either good 
or indifferent. There are practices that we have good reason to regard as 
mistaken and less than optimal, perhaps even harmful, for the development 
of children’s intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities but against which 
the law gives us no power to act.28  There is a zone, we believe, within which 
parents may act according to their best lights—even when those lights are
pretty dim.29 
You might say that my argument turns back on itself: if tolerance
requires us to stand by while things we regard as bad are happening, then
tolerance is a moral mistake.  Better to return to the pre-liberal triad of
good, bad, and indifferent.  Resisting or preventing the bad has the virtues 
of clarity and simplicity, and it is a source of inner satisfaction as well.
As a normative practice, tolerance stands or falls with the reasons
for forbearance.  Some are prudential. The effort to suppress what is bad
may generate more harm than it abates.30  In the face of disagreement about 
what good childrearing is, for example, imposing a comprehensive standard
could undermine social cohesion and generate intractable controversy.31 
Taken to its limit, the rejection of forbearance obliterates the line between
public and private.32  Everything becomes subject to public scrutiny and 
public law.33  But liberalism rests on a distinction between what is public
and what is not. Regimes that reject that distinction almost always lapse
into fanaticism and tyranny—or so the experience of the past two centuries 
suggests.34 
There are also epistemological reasons for forbearance.  Beyond a limited 
number of fixed points—slavery is wrong, for example—our moral beliefs 
often outrun our moral knowledge.35  Justice Holmes may have come 
uncomfortably close to comprehensive skepticism, but his famous dissent
 28. See Len Biernat & Dr. Christine Jax, Limiting Mobility and Improving Student
Achievement, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 19–26 (1999). 
29. See id.
 30. See JAMES KALB, TYRANNY OF LIBERALISM: UNDERSTANDING AND OVERCOMING 
ADMINISTERED FREEDOM, INQUISITORIAL TOLERANCE, AND EQUALITY BY COMMAND 5–7
(2008).
31. See id.
 32. Id. at 5–6. 
33. See id. at 5–7. 
34. Id. 
35. See, e.g., OBERDIEK, supra note 26, at 48–49. 
 205

































    
   
  
  
in Abrams stood on solid ground: time has indeed upset many fighting 
faiths.36 
And there are some standard moral arguments for forbearance.  If 
liberty interests give individuals moral claims beyond their (equal) weight 
in the aggregate calculus of harm and benefit, then forbearance will be 
mandatory in a wide range of cases.37  Liberty entails the right to be wrong 
and to do wrong—within limits.38  In a similar vein, anti-paternalism often 
will require forbearance when an individual’s mistaken understanding of
her well-being, or failure to act on a correct understanding, affects only
herself.39 
That said, I have always harbored doubts about John Stuart Mill’s
famous harm principle.  In the first place, it is notoriously difficult to draw 
a bright line between harm to self and to others.  Consider a man who overeats
to the point of obesity.  He will be hard-put to perform military service,
no matter how dire the emergency.40  Over time, he will find it harder to
maintain steady employment and contribute to his family’s finances than
if he had kept himself in reasonable shape.41  And he is more likely to suffer
from chronic conditions that few individuals can afford to treat without 
public subsidies.42  The amount each of us chooses to eat is among the
most personal choices we make, and yet it affects others in myriad ways. 
It turns out, moreover, that Mill could not hew consistently to his own
principle, as his bridge hypothetical makes clear.  It goes like this: a man
is approaching a bridge in danger of collapse.  Knowing this, an observer
forcibly prevents him from crossing this bridge.  Mill’s stated justification: 
“Liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall 
into the river.”43 
Note the difficulties of Mill’s position.  First, the observer assumes that
the man does not know that the bridge is dangerous.44  Perhaps he does and 
seeks to take his own life. Although certain actions usually reflect specific 
intentions, we cannot infer intention from action in individual cases. 
Unless Mill believes (oddly) that one can never desire to commit suicide, 
his argument fails. 
36.  Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
37. See Mill, supra note 5, at 23, 186. 
38. See id. at 186. 
39. See id.
 40. See Andrea E. Chernov, Weight Discrimination: The Effects of Obesity on 
Employment and Promotion, 4 HOHONU 107, 108 (2006). 
41. See id. at 108, 111. 
42. See generally Ross A. Hammond & Ruth Levine, The Economic Impact of Obesity
in the United States, 3 DIABETES, METABOLIC SYNDROME & OBESITY 285 (2010). 
43. See Mill, supra note 5, at 186. 
44. See id.
206
GALSTON (DO NOT DELETE) 8/16/2018 10:45 AM     
 











    















[VOL. 54:  199, 2017] Liberal Tolerance 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
In addition, there are many circumstances in which there is a gap 
between action and desire.  We all do things whose results diverge from
the outcomes we want.  Often we know they will diverge, and yet we go
on repeating the actions that frustrate our desires.  Others may be aware 
of our frustrated desire as well. If others may justifiably intervene in our 
lives whenever they have compelling reasons to believe that our actions
are contradicting our desires, then the writ of liberty is much narrower 
than Mill’s official doctrine suggests, and the scope of justified paternalism 
is much wider. 
The deepest problem with Mill’s position—the harm principle modified 
by the bridge exception—is that it proves too much.  As the philosopher 
Thomas Christiano has pointed out, religious believers can use the modified
harm principle to justify intolerance.45  As Christiano puts it, the intolerant
believer can argue that “the unbeliever is ignorant of facts that are crucial
to his well being, namely the facts concerning to the transcendent interests
in adhering to the one true faith and the disastrous consequences of adhering 
to a false faith or no faith at all.  Thus the unbeliever is acting involuntarily 
when he fails to adhere to the true faith.”46  And the analogy to Mill’s bridge
may be extended: “There is a sense in which the unbeliever is in a significant
danger that he will learn from his mistakes too late, since it is quite possible 
that he will not learn his mistake until he experiences the sufferings of the 
damned.”47 
The only way to defeat this argument is to deny its core premise, that
we can know the determinants of spiritual harm with the same confidence 
as the determinants of physical harm.  If so, liberal tolerance would rest
on some distinction between knowledge and faith.
No doubt believers would claim that faith is on a par with knowledge. 
No believer can sincerely aver that the case for his faith is no stronger than
the case for other faiths. To do so would be to undercut faith. 
But believers may be able to accept that what is evident to them may
not be equally evident to others.  Demonstrating to others the truth of one’s
faith is not the same as demonstrating in a laboratory the truth of a proposition 
about chemical reactions.  Indeed, Christians are taught that “faith is the 
45. See Thomas Christiano, Does Religious Tolerance Make Any Sense?, in
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 171, 179 (Laurence Thomas ed., 2008). 
46. Id. at 179. 
47. Id.
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substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen.”48  Not every 
doubting Thomas can receive the proof he seeks.49 
I suspect that much of what we take to be religious tolerance rests on 
epistemological considerations.  From a point of view internal to faith, 
believers should be able to understand why doubters who seek proof without 
receiving it find it so difficult to take a leap of faith, and some believers
do understand.  For their part, many skeptics argue that what each faith counts
as evidence is internal to that faith, with no external standpoint from which
competing claims can be assessed.
IV. TOLERANCE AS A CIVIL AND POLITICAL PRACTICE
Tolerance does not require acceptance of differences within voluntary 
organizations.50  If certain opinions and practices define membership in a
group, and if membership in that group is a qualification for membership 
in a voluntary organization, then the group is not acting intolerantly when
it excludes individuals who do not share those views and participate in 
those practices.51 
There is room for argument, however, about identifying the opinions
and practices that define the group’s core identity.  For example, the Anglican
Church is currently embroiled in a debate about homosexuality and same-
sex marriages.52  For conservative bishops, opposition to homosexuality 
is part of the biblical teaching at the heart of the Anglican denomination.53 
For more liberal bishops—including the head of the church, the archbishop
of Canterbury—it is not.54  If the two sides cannot find a formula that
permits sustainable coexistence under a single denominational roof, the Church
may split.55  Within voluntary associations, the practice of tolerance means
the disposition of their members to remain together despite their differences. 
48. Hebrews 11:1 (King James). 
49. See John 20:24–29 (King James). 
50. T.M. SCANLON, The Difficulty of Tolerance, in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE:
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 187, 194 (2003). 
51. Id. 
52. See, e.g., Harriet Sherwood, Gay Rights and Same-Sex Marriage Will Dominate 
C of E Summer Synod, GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2016, 8:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2016/feb/15/gay-rights-and-same-sex-marriage-will-dominate-c-of-e-summer-synod 
[https://perma.cc/GJR7-XXJ7].
53. John Bingham, Church of England Parishes Consider First Step to Break Away
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Many Orthodox Jews believe that Reform Jews are not really Jewish at
all.56 They are free to say why they believe that to be the case, to 
proselytize among Reform Jews, and even to impede religious marriages
between members of the Orthodox community and Reform Jews who do
not qualify as Jews under Jewish law.57  Tolerance does not require any group,
religious or secular, to abandon or water down beliefs and practices 
that define their group identity—which is not to say that other considerations
might not require them to make such changes.58 
This brings us to tolerance as a political practice, which at its core 
means refraining from using public power to suppress beliefs and actions 
to which the state objects.59  A number of limits to tolerance, so understood, 
enjoy wide acceptance.
	 Certain kinds of conduct—public displays of nudity, for 
example—may be offensive to longstanding social norms.60 
Norms of decency evolve, of course. 
	 Actions that harm others do not enjoy immunity just because
they define a group’s identity.61  A neo-Aztec group may 
believe that failing to sacrifice virgins annually will disrupt 
the cosmic order, but the state must act to prevent this
practice—even if the virgins have signed consent forms.62 
	 More broadly, the state may invoke a range of civil concerns
to suppress acts that might otherwise be protected.  A liberal 
state cannot suppress the ritual use of animal slaughter just
because a majority disapproves of the practice.  But if there
56. For an especially conspicuous example, see Isabel Kershner, Israeli Minister 
Says Reform Jews Are Not Really Jewish, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A8. 
57. See Ephraim Tabory, The Identity Dilemma of Non-Orthodox Religious Movements: 
Reform and Conservative Judaism in Israel, in TRADITION, INNOVATION, CONFLICT: JEWISHNESS
AND JUDAISM IN CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL 135, 140 (Zvi Sobel & Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi
eds., 1991).
58. See Russell Powell & Steve Clarke, Religion, Tolerance, and Intolerance: Views 
from Across the Disciplines, in RELIGION, INTOLERANCE, AND CONFLICT: A SCIENTIFIC AND 
CONCEPTUAL INVESTIGATION 1, 6 (Steve Clarke et al. eds., 2013). 
59. See Ikuenobe, supra note 23, at 317–18. 
60. J. BUDZISZEWSKI, TRUE TOLERANCE: LIBERALISM AND THE NECESSITY OF JUDGMENT
82 (1992).












       









    
     
   
    
 
 
    
    
 
   
 
 
is evidence that it constitutes a threat to public health, state 
intervention is justified.63 
	 More broadly still, a liberal democracy may outlaw actions,
expressive or otherwise, that threaten the overall practice 
of tolerance. Suppose that a political party advocates the 
outright suppression of Islamic worship—by denying mosques
zoning and construction licenses and criminalizing Islamic
services even in private homes.64  If the anti-Islam party 
remains on the fringe, without public support, the government 
may choose to leave it undisturbed, in Thomas Jefferson’s 
words, as a monument “of the safety with which error of 
opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat 
it.”65 But if reason proves unequal to the task, I suggest, the
state may step in before it is too late. 
	 Most broadly, a liberal democracy may prevent practices,
religious or secular, that could undermine the liberal
democratic order itself. In two key 19th century Mormon
cases, the government argued that polygamy and autocracy
go together, as do monogamy and democracy.66  There is 
room for debate about how the historical record is best read. 
But if sustained by the evidence, the form of the government’s 
argument is appropriate and warrants the suppression of 
polygamous practices, despite their centrality for early
Mormonism.67 
Tolerance as a political practice does not require anything like what 
some call “neutrality.”68  It is not intolerant for a liberal democracy to espouse
 63. See generally KIMBERLY K. SMITH, GOVERNING ANIMALS: ANIMAL WELFARE 
AND THE LIBERAL STATE (2012).
64. This example is adapted from China’s efforts to suppress the Falun Gong. See
James Griffiths, Why China Fears the Falun Gong, L.A. DAILY NEWS (July 14, 2014, 5:34
PM), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20140714/why-china-fears-the-falun-gong 
[https://perma.cc/35MY-438G]; Rick Rojas, Falun Gong Followers Protest Chinese
President Xi in Desert Visit, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2013, 5:15 AM), http://www.latimes. 
com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-falun-gong-xi-protest-20130607-story.html [https://perma.cc/
YFC3-VFCS]. 
65. Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J.
1, 1 (1995) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, First Draft of the Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), 
in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 3 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897)). 
66. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, PUBLIC MATTERS: POLITICS, POLICY, AND RELIGION 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 131, 133 (2005) (citing Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). 
67. See id. at 132. 
68. See Ikuenobe, supra note 23, at 317–18. 
210
GALSTON (DO NOT DELETE) 8/16/2018 10:45 AM     
 



















      
 
 
   
    
   
 
      
  
  
   
  






[VOL. 54:  199, 2017] Liberal Tolerance 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tolerance and defend it against its adversaries.  It is not always intolerant
for the liberal state to deny intolerant individuals and groups the ability to
express their views.  Consistent with tolerance, the Supreme Court could 
have taken a stand against the notorious Nazi march through Skokie, Illinois.69 
Nor does tolerance require a level playing field.  A liberal state may
advocate what it cannot mandate and criticize or even disadvantage what 
it cannot forbid. Groups whose internal practices violate public norms of
tolerance may have the right to exist, but denying them public privileges 
such as tax exemptions, as the Supreme Court did in Bob Jones University
v. United States, is not per se incompatible with tolerance.70  Conversely,
several European democracies offer financial and legal benefits to some
but not all religions.71  While there may be sound policy and political reasons 
for abandoning these preferential practices, they do not amount to a breach
of tolerance as I understand it.
There is a hard-to-define point, however, at which asymmetrical policies
do shade over into outright intolerance.  Reform, Conservatives, and
Reconstructionist Jews are not prohibited from establishing congregations 
in Israel.72  But the quasi-established status of strict Orthodoxy creates 
powerful barriers.73  Orthodox rabbis are entitled to state support; non-
Orthodox rabbis are not.74  The law, moreover, empowers the Orthodox
rabbinate to control the legal processes of marriage, divorce, and conversion.75 
Israel’s most important statute, The Law of Return, grants every Jew in 
the world the right to settle in Israel.76 But who is a Jew?  Section 4B states 
that “For purposes of this Law, ‘Jew’ means a person who was born of a
 69. See Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43–44 (1977).
70. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595–96, 605 (1983) 
(holding that the IRS properly denied Bob Jones University tax-exempt status due to the 
University’s religiously-motivated, racially-discriminatory admissions criteria).
71. See RELIGARE, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE RELIGARE PROJECT 27, 33 (Marie-
Claire Foblets & Katie Alidadi eds., 2013), http://www.religareproject.eu/system/files/RELIGARE
%20Summary%20Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DB9-7T4T]. 
72. See Tabory, supra note 57, at 139. 
73. See id. at 140, 142–43. 
74. See id. at 135, 143. 
75. See Uriel Heilman, ‘We Want Equal Rights in Israel,’ Non-Orthodox Jewish 
Leaders Tell Rivlin, TIMES ISR. (Dec. 12, 2015, 2:22 AM), http://www.timesofisrael. 
com/we-want-equal-rights-reform-and-conservative-leaders-tell-rivlin/ [https://perma.cc/
TA34-3C8S].
76. See Gershom Gorenberg, How Do You Prove You’re a Jew?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Mar. 2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/magazine/02jewishness-t.html?_r=1
[https://perma.cc/SR3M-KFFL].
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Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism.”77  Matrilineal descent 
excludes a substantial number of Reform Jews; when a mother’s status is
challenged, it must be certified by the legally recognized Rabbinate.78 The 
alternative route to guaranteed admission—conversion—is entirely under
the control of the Rabbinate.79  In principle, then, immigration to Israel—the
principal determinant of its population since 194880—is regulated by
the legally empowered representatives of the established religion of a state
that defines itself in religious terms.81  Israel is a robust democracy, but it
is not exactly a liberal democracy, and its religious practices do not meet the
test of tolerance as I have defined it. 
V. TOLERANCE AND THE FORCE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
Why is tolerance as a political practice desirable? Obviously, restraining 
ourselves from translating disagreement into coercive suppression is a 
good thing whenever we lack an adequate basis for doing so.  But in a
well-known essay, the philosopher Thomas Scanlon offers a more directly 
political answer.82  Because every society, no matter how homogeneous, 
is bound to contain people who disagree about how to live and how to
shape their country’s common life, then something like tolerance is
necessary if the idea of common citizenship is to be possible.83  Without
recognizing others as entitled to contribute to the definition of our society,
Scanlon argues, we are “just rival groups contending over the same territory.”84
 77. Israel’s Basic Laws: The Law of Return, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewish 
virtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/Other_Law_Law_of_Return.html [https://perma.cc/S8KN- 
X2WK] (stating that Section 4B was added in 1970 as an amendment to the original law,
which was enacted in 1950). 
78. See Gorenberg, supra note 76 (describing one woman’s struggle to satisfy the 
Rabbinate of her mother’s Jewishness in order to marry in Israel).
79. See Bernard Avishai, A Missed Opportunity to Support Secular Life in Israel, 
NEW YORKER (May 6, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-missed-
opportunity-to-support-secular-life-in-israel [https://perma.cc/QLV5-L8NV].
80. See Israel at 68: A Statistical Glimpse, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (May 8, 
2016), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Spotlight/Pages/Israel-at-68-A-statistical-glimpse. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/Q5D3-4APH]. 
81. Amanda Borschel-Dan, All I Want Is to Have a Jewish Family, Says US Convert 
Rejected by Israeli Rabbinate, TIMES ISR. (July 5, 2016, 9:59 AM), http://www.times 
ofisrael.com/all-i-want-to-do-is-have-a-jewish-family-says-us-convert-rejected-by-israeli- 
rabbinate/ [https://perma.cc/FNU7-3B68] (illustrating that, because the Rabbinate controls 
who is recognized as being Jewish, the Rabbinate indirectly influences immigration). 
82. See generally SCANLON, supra note 50. 
83. Id. at 193. 
84. Id.  Iraq and Syria offer vivid examples of this alternative. See Lyse Doucet,
Iraq Seeks More Help as It Sets Sights on Mosul, BBC NEWS (July 20, 2016), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36845694 [https://perma.cc/UMF8-SPRE]. 
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In this respect, citizenship in a political community differs from membership 
in a voluntary association.85 To the extent that associations are organized 
around shared goods, doctrines, or practices, the group must condition
membership on agreement, or at least on confining disagreement within
strict limits.86 But the goods of political society, such as the right to vote,
hold office, and participate in public discussions, Scanlon asserts, “do not 
lose their meaning if they are extended to people with whom we disagree 
about the kind of society we would like to have.”87 
Although Scanlon’s thesis has intuitive force, it cannot be accepted as 
it stands. In the first place, no political community is just an ensemble of 
institutions and procedures; each rests on shared understandings and
purposes.88  Often this agreement is tacit, but on occasion it becomes explicit. 
Consider the process of “naturalization” through which foreigners become
U.S. citizens.89  It culminates with the Oath of Allegiance, in which each 
new American pledges not only to defend the Constitution and laws against
all enemies, foreign and domestic, but also to bear “true faith and allegiance” 
to them.90  That means, among other things, accepting in one’s mind and
heart the “republican form of government”91 in which, as James Madison 
put it, all legitimate powers are derived directly or indirectly from the 
people.92  And because the Constitution excludes all religious tests for public
office, new citizens cannot take the oath sincerely without abjuring all
 85. See SCANLON, supra note 50, at 194. 
86. See id.
 87. Id. at 194–95. 
88. In comments on my conference paper, Thomas A. Smith cites the Amish to 
argue that the search for shared values in a liberal society is bound to fail and that we end 
up with what Scanlon and I reject—namely, a geographical space shared by contending 
factions. Id. at 193 (referring to Scanlon’s comment about “rival groups contending over 
the same territory”); Thomas Smith, Brookings Inst., Comments at Inst. for Law and Religion
Conference (Feb. 5–6, 2016).  I cheerfully concede that the Amish are a good example
of diversity at the level of principle.  In this respect, they are more like resident aliens who obey
the law without necessarily subscribing to its underlying principles.  The majority can
accommodate this precisely because the Amish are such a small and unthreatening minority. If
they were much larger or less pacific, the majority’s calculus would be different and—
depending on the facts—perhaps, justifiably so. 
89. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION 31 (2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/M-476.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2C5-
YZBT].
90. Id. at 28. 
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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thoughts of theocracy.93  Although native-born Americans attain citizenship
without oaths or conditions, they are bound as citizens to the same affirmations 
and prohibitions that apply to naturalized citizens. 
Second, differences of national history may warrant diverse definitions 
of tolerance. To pick the most conspicuous example, the collapse of the 
Weimar Republican and the global catastrophe that ensued moved the 
drafters of the post-war constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany
to enact restraints on expression, assembly, and political activity designed 
to protect the constitutional order against attacks from extremists and
totalitarians of every stripe.94 The constitution establishes procedures through 
which associations and political parties determined to be threats to the
regime may be banned and dissolved.95  Another article allows the government,
acting through the Constitutional Court, to deprive individuals of certain
fundamental rights if they have used those rights to combat the “free 
democratic order.”96  In the early years of the Federal Republic, these powers
were used to disband the Nazi-style Socialist Imperial Party (SRP) in 1952
and the German Communist Party in 1956.97 
When the government applied for a court order to disband the SRP, the 
party defended itself by asserting its determination to comply fully with
the constitution’s institutions and procedures.98  The Constitutional Court
rejected the SRP’s claim, countering that the post-war German republic 
was not merely a constitutional order but also a normative order requiring, 
“[a]t the very least, respect for the rights of man as set forth in the Basic
Law, above all respect for the rights of one individual to life and free 
development, [and] the sovereignty of the people . . . .”99  The Nazis  
had destroyed the Weimar Republic without violating its constitutional
 93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
 94. See COLIN STORER, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 194 (2013); 
Wise, supra note 2, at 302–03. 
95. See Wise, supra note 2, at 307, 311 (citing GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW],
art. 9(2), art. 21(2) (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ 
englisch_gg.html#p0050 [https://perma.cc/24RQ-2GNS]). 
96. See id. at 307 n.45 (citing GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 18 (Ger.),
translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0050 [https:// 
perma.cc/24RQ-2GNS]). 
97. See  DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 286, 289–90 (3d ed. 2012) 
(referencing and translating excerpts of BVERFG, 2 BVERFG 1, Oct. 23, 1952 (Ger.) and
BVERFG, 5 BVERFG 85, Aug. 17, 1956 (Ger.)).
98. See Paul Franz, Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political Parties: A German-
American Comparison, 5 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 56–57 (1982) (citing 2 BVERFG 
1 (12) (Ger.)). 
99. See id. at 57 (quoting 2 BVERFG 1 (13) (Ger.)).
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procedures,100 and the Court was determined to use the newly-entrenched 
substantive understanding of liberal democracy as a bulwark against any 
possible repetition.101 
Four years later, when the continued existence of the German Communist
Party was at issue, the Court expanded on its earlier ruling.102  Certain 
fundamental values, it declared, “shall be recognized as absolute values, 
and therefore protected against every attack.”103  The Constitution’s principle
of the dignity of man, the Court held, would trump any doctrine or party 
to the contrary, even if the rejection of human dignity enjoyed near-universal 
public support.104  Political parties do not have an absolute right to exist,
because each political party is a constitutional entity with a responsibility to
support the fundamental norms of a liberal democratic order.105 
It would be an exaggeration to say that U.S. political parties enjoy an
unqualified right to exist.106  It is evident, nonetheless, that the German
conception of political tolerance is narrower than its U.S. counterpart. 
Germany is not an intolerant polity or society, but its national experience
has shaped its understanding of the risks that its liberal democratic 
institutions can safely run. 
The defense of tolerance as I understand it does not imply that the drafters
of the German constitution were wrong to take this experience into 
account.107  This is to say that tolerance is a concept admitting of a range
of legitimate conceptions or specifications—and that each particular conception 
can be more or less appropriate, depending on the circumstances of its 
application.
Circumstances vary across time as well as national boundaries.  In ordinary
times, President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would 
have been a tyrannical overreach.108  In early 1861, it could be defended
 100. See STORER, supra note 94, at 194 (explaining how the Nazis’ passage of the Enabling 
Act permitted Hitler to amend the Weimar Constitution at will).
101. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 97, at 290–91 (quoting 5 BVERFG 85 (139)
(Ger.)). For an extended account of this episode, see Wise, supra note 2, at 304–311. 
102. See Franz, supra note 98, at 60 (citing 5 BVERFG 85 (139) (Ger.)).
103. Id. (quoting 5 BVERFG 85 (139) (Ger.)). 
104. See id. (citing 5 BVERFG 85 (139) (Ger.)). 
105.  For a fuller account, see Franz, supra note 98, at 59–62. 
106. See id. at 69–70.  For instance, the Communist Control Act of 1954, which the 
Supreme Court has never ruled unconstitutional, did make the Communist Party of the 
United States illegal.  50 U.S.C. § 842 (2000). 
107. See KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 97, at 287. 
108. See James A. Dueholm, Lincoln’s Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus:
An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 29 J. ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASS’N 47, 48 (2008)
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as essential to the continuation of the constitutional order.109  Permitting 
Confederate sympathizers to obstruct the flow of men and material vital
to the defense of the nation’s capital would not have been an act of political
tolerance, but rather a dereliction of constitutional duty.110 
(quoting Letter from Abraham Lincoln to General Winfield Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 347 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953)),
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/lincoln-s-suspension-of-the-writ-of-habeas-
corpus.pdf?c=jala;idno=2629860.0029.205 [https://perma.cc/WP5S-YKPA]. 
109. See id. at 49–50 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special 
Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 108, at
430).
110. See id. at 48. 
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